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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following subsections of 
Section 34-35-7.1 of the Utah Code is determinative of the issues 
in this appeal: 
(l)(c) A request for agency action made 
under this section shall be filed within 180 
days after the alleged discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice occurred. 
(16) The commencement of an action under 
federal law for relief based upon any act 
prohibited by this chapter bars the 
commencement or continuation of any 
adjudicative proceeding before the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division in connection with 
the same claims under this chapter. ... 
The interpretation of Section 78-12-40 of the Utah Code 
may also govern: 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the same shall 
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and 
the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
4. This Reply Brief does not deal with the first and 
third points contained in petitioner's opening Brief, namely that 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("UADA") should be construed 
liberally and that petitioner Federico should not be barred for 
taking the initial steps in pursuit of her federal remedies, 
since they were not addressed in the Joint Brief of Respondents. 
2 
5. Jurisdiction existed for Federico's case to have 
been reop'ened, there being no 180-day bar to a reopening. The 
case should have been reopened based on equitable considerations. 
6. A refiling was timely since equitable tolling was 
appropriate, and the saving statute would apply in any event. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE ARGUMENTS SHOWING THAT THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
ACT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS REMEDIAL 
PURPOSES, AND THAT TAKING THE FIRST STEP TO ASSERT FEDERAL RIGHTS 
DOES NOT FOREVER PRECLUDE ASSERTION OF STATE RIGHTS, HAVE NOT 
BEEN ADDRESSED. 
In opening Brief of Petitioner, the first and third 
arguments supported the following respective statements: 
"1. The Antidiscrimination Act should be liberally 
construed to accomplish its remedial purposes." 
"3. Taking the first steo to assert federal rights does 
not forever preclude assertion of state rights." 
The Joint Brief of Respondents does not appear to 
address either of these points. 
As to the matter of a liberal construction, that Brief 
does state on page 5 that a statute must be given its olain 
meaning. Federico does not disagree with that principle. 
Respondents then make the bald statement on page 6 that 
there are no unclear or ambiguous terms in Section 34-35-7.1. 
But that does not address how terms that might be found ambiguous 
should be construed. 
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this point. 
In addition, all of the Industrial Commission's Order of 
Dismissal and other documents bear the UADD numbers assigned when 
Federico initially filed her charges against Sears. 
h request to reopen is permissible. 
Respondents argued on page 9 of their Brief that if 
Federico is permitted to resume her claim "UADD will never be 
able to close a file." 
Perhaps the use of this term "close" correlates to the 
use of that same term in the following sentence in UADD's March 
8, 1991 letter to Federico, "We will then move to close your 
charges with both the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) 
and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)." 
The term "close" does not aooear to have been taken from 
any applicable statute. 
Subsection 63-46b-5(1)(i) of the Utah Code requires a 
decision within a reasonable time after the "close" of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding. This would not appear to 
correlate to the "close" of a file. 
However, the "close" of a file would appear to be 
analogous to the "close" of a case in bankruptcy. 
11 U.S.C. Subsection 350(a) provides: "After an estate 
is fully administered and the court has discharged the trustee, 
the court shall close the case." 
Sears would have this Court believe that for a matter to 
be closed, there must not be any possible subsequent reopening. 
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statutes give no explicit nor implicit grant of discretion to the 
respondent to interpret the extent of these limits to its 
jurisdiction. 
In the case of Nielsen v. Division of P.O.S.T., 851 P.2d 
1201 (Utah App. 1993), the Court found it had been urged to 
require the agency to adjudicate matters over which the agency 
had not be statutorily granted jurisdiction. This it declined to 
do. 
The Nielsen Court explained, citing several cases in 
support, that agencies have no more power than that which is 
expressly or impliedly granted by statute. Thus an agency cannot 
adopt rules, and thereby gain power and jurisdiction. 
The case of Mt. Olympus Waters v. Utah State Tax Com1n, 
243 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah App. 1994) likewise cites several 
cases in support of the proposition that an agency's rules must 
be in harmony with its governing statute. 
Subsection 63-64a-12.1(4 ) (a ) (i ) of the Utah Code 
specifically empowers the district court to invalidate a rule 
made without legal authority. 
For UADD to be without jurisdiction to reopen a matter, 
it must likewise be unable to provide for such a reopening by 
rule. This Court would be in the position of having to strike 
down such a rule. However, that is not the case. 
It is within the jurisdiction and grant of power, 
especially considering the remedial nature of the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act ("UADA"), for the UADD to promulgate the 
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following rule: 
"If the Division discontinues its procedure at the 
request of the charging party, and a lawsuit based on the charges 
is timely brought, the merits of the charges are not reached, and 
the lawsuit is dismissed without prejudice to administrative 
action, UADD may reopen the matter upon request of the charging 
party made within 180 days after that dismissal." 
This rule would be eminently fair and in accordance with 
the purposes and implications of the UADA. Since such a rule 
would not give the UADD greater power than provided by statute, 
UADD now has jurisdiction to reopen the matters concerning 
Federico. Federico is entitled to have that jurisdiction 
exercised. 
The 180-day limit does not apply to a request to reopen. 
Subsection 63-46b-3(l) of the Utah Code states that 
adjudicative proceedings in an agency are commenced by (a) an 
agency itself giving notice of agency action or by "(b) a request 
for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by persons other 
than the agency." 
Thus a "request for agency action" is a term of art, 
referring to how a person other than an agency commences agency 
proceedings. It is to an agency what a complaint is to a civil 
court. 
Subsection 34-35-7.1(1)(c) of the Utah Code states: 
A request for agency action made under this 
section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited 
employment practice occurred. 
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Since a "request for agency action" is a term of art, 
referring only to the commencing of agency proceedings, the limit 
of 180 days would not apply to any subsequent request. It would 
not aoply to a request for an evidentiary hearing, nor a request 
for review, nor a request to reooen. 
Respondents have phrased their only issue in terms of 
whether the 180-day limitations period had expired. That 
limitation period is not even applicable to a request to reopen. 
Equitable considerations balance in favor of Federico. 
There is no statutory limit for the time in which a 
person may request a bankruptcy case be reopened. However, 
laches may constitute a bar if the request is delayed too long. 
Laches would certainly not be applicable to bar 
Federico1s request to reopen. It was filed well within the 180 
days the legislature found to be reasonable for the initial 
filing. The saving statute allows an action to be filed within 
one year after a dismissal without prejudice, even if the initial 
action had to be filed within three months. Standard Fed. Sav. <& 
Loan y^_ Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). 
Federico is likewise not barred on the basis of estoppel 
from having her claims adjudicated. Federico!s request that UADD 
discontinue its administrative process so that she could pursue 
court remedies is not inconsistent with her later request that 
UADD resume such consideration since despite a timely filing, no 
court had or would reach the merits of her charges. 
Claiming that Federicofs request is inconsistent with 
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her initial request for withdrawal is like claiming that UADD's 
denial of jurisdiction is inconsistent with its statement on the 
Request for Withdrawal form (R. 5-6 ) f "Please note that both 
agencies are still prepared to proceed with your charge if you so 
desire." Circumstances subsequently changed. 
Federico certainly does not seek equity with unclean 
hands. She has pursued her claims in good faith and has not sat 
on her rights. 
Federico has certainly done nothing amiss in "forum 
shopping." As respondents have indicated, she had a choice of 
federal or state court. This whole matter could have been 
resolved on the merits in the first and only court chosen by 
Federico had Sears so desired. Sears apparently knew Federico 
could amend her complaint to include federal causes of action and 
the state court could exercise concurrent jurisdiction under 
Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 
1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990). However, Sears successfully 
pursued dismissal of the entire state court action on the basis 
of a lack of jurisdiction over claims based on state law. 
Obviously Sears had no duty to explain to Federico that 
she needed to amend her complaint to add federal claims. It had 
a right to keep to itself its superior knowledge of procedure and 
jurisdiction. But it does seem inappropriate for Sears to 
condemn Federico for moving on to a different forum because she 
believed there was no defense to Sears1 motion to dismiss. 
Sears claims reasonable inaction on the basis of 
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Federicofs actions. On page 14 of its brief it states it did not 
pursue an extensive investigation because it recognized the state 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Sears does not explain 
how it recognized that Federico would not amend her complaint in 
state court to add claims based on federal law. 
Thus Sears claims detriment on the basis that it has 
postponed investigation in light of its belief that the matters 
could not be reopened before UADD. This must be balanced against 
the potential harm to Federico. Not only has she also suffered 
by the delay in investigation, but if UADD actually does not have 
jurisdiction, then there is no way for the matters between her 
and Sears to be made right. 
3. JURISDICTION EXISTED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXERCISED 
BASED ON A REFILING. 
Equitable tolling gave Federico 180 days to refile. 
On pages 8-9 of their brief, respondents argue that 
under the cases of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 489 
F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1973) and McClendon v. North American Rockwell 
Corp. , 2 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec, par. 10,243 (CD. Cal. 1970), 
Federico would have had no more than an additional 90 days to 
file suit in another forum after the state court dismissal. 
However, respondents misread these cases. 
In each of those cases, there was a limit of 30 days 
within which the action had to be filed in court. In each case, 
the action was filed in the wrong court and there was a dismissal 
without prejudice. And in each case, the decision indicated that 
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at the most there were only an additional 30 days within which 
the action had to be refiled in the appropriate court. 
In the instant matter, Federico had 180 days to file 
with UADD. Applying the Johnson and McClendon cases by analogy, 
Federico had at the most 180 days within which to file with the 
UADD once her court action had been dismissed without prejudice 
to further agency action. She did so within that 180 days. 
Although there is no federal saving statute, federal 
courts have allowed equitable tolling of time limits within which 
filings must be made. Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 
1980) and Valenzuela v^ Kraft, Inc. , 801 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 
1986), modified 815 F.2d 570 (1987), are two such cases. In each 
of these cases, there was equitable tolling of the ninety-day 
period within which the plaintiffs had to file their Title VII 
actions in court after receiving their right-to-sue letters. 
The saving statute gave Federico a year to refile. 
There is no federal saving statute, allowing a certain 
length of time to refile an action after the first has been 
dismissed without prejudice. 
Therefore, the federal courts making the decisions cited 
in the previous section could only extend the time within which 
to file an action after a dismissal without prejudice on the 
basis of equitable tolling. 
Furthermore, they could not refer to the amount of time 
set forth in a saving statute as a benchmark in determining the 
extent of equitable tolling. 
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Utah law has no such deficiency. 
In the McClendon case, as was mentioned above, the 
filing took place more than thirty days after the dismissal 
without prejudice. The court wrestled with the fact that more 
than thirty days had passed, and there was no federal saving 
statute. 
The only tolling principle conceivably 
applicable is that filing of a suit within the 
thirty days, even though dismissed later 
pursuant to plaintifffs motion, serves to stay 
indefinitely the operation of the thirty day 
requirement of Section 706(e). McClendon, 
supra, 2 CCH Emp. Prac. Dec, oar. 10,243 at 
973. 
The Johnson court faced the same dilemma, where the 30 
days had passed and there was no saving statute to impose another 
subsequent limit. 
We are of the opinion that the District 
Court was clearly correct in holding that at a 
minimum Johnson had to file the new case within 
thirty days from the date of dismissal without 
prejudice. 
Any other holding would result in 
plaintiff's having no time limitation to refile 
in this type of an action after the action had 
been dismissed without prejudice. Johnson, 
supra, 489 F.2d at 529. 
On the other hand, Utah has a saving statute, Section 
78-12-40 of the Utah Code. Equitable tolling need not be limited 
to another period identical to the initial period. As indicated 
above, the saving statute allows an action to be filed within one 
year after a dismissal without prejudice, even if the initial 
action had to be filed within three months. Standard Fed. Sav. &_ 
Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). 
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Furthermore/ there is no restriction to equitable 
tolling in light of the additional time statutorily conferred by 
means of the saving statute. 
The case of Simmons v. Mountain Bell, 806 P.2d 6 (Mont. 
1990) referred to in Federico's opening brief is an example of 
how a rule of law generally applied to courts may also be aoplied 
to an agency, especially where such an application leads to 
greater flexibility and equity. 
There is nothing in the saving statute that prohibits 
its application to agency actions, nor is there any case law to 
that effect. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should remand these matters to UADD on the 
basis that UADD has jurisdiction to adjudicate them. 
Respondents have not argued that UADD lacks jurisdiction 
by reason of any action by Federico to pursue rights under 
federal law. Nor have they argued against a liberal construction 
of any ambiguity in the UADA. 
The question of UADD's jurisdiction is strictly a 
question of law, and cannot be expanded by the UADD itself. Yet 
a rule providing for the reopening of its proceedings under the 
facts of this case would not be invalidated. This would be 
analogous to bankruptcy and divorce actions. 
Equitable tolling and the saving statute provide ample 
basis for UADD to honor a second request for agency action under 
the facts of this case. 
14 
Thus there is no impediment for this Court to decide 
that UADD can proceed to consider Federico's two charges of 
discrimination against Sears. 
DATED this Z (> ~~ day of ^/f^J^^M-- ? 1994. 
-^£ ^ — ^^^^TTt^-rJ 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
Attorney for Charging Party 
and Petitioner 
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HENRYE HEATH 
PHILIP R F1SHLER 
ROGER H BULLOCK 
ROBERTA BURTON 
R SCOTT WILLIAMS 
DENNIS M ASTILL 
S BAIRD MORGAN 
STUARTH SCHULTZ 
PAULM BELNAP 
STEPHEN J TRAYNEK 
ALSO MCMBCR CAUrORNIA BAR 
2 ALSO MEMSCR ORCQON BAH 
3 ALSO MCMBCR WASHINGTON 0 C BAM 
JOSEPH J JOYCE 
BRADLEY W BOWEN 
VICTORIA K KIDMAN 
ROBERT L JANICKf 
ELIZABETH L WJLLEY* 
PETER H CHRISTENSEN * 
H BURT RINGWOOO 
OAVID R NIELSON 
ADAM F TRUPP 
CATHERINE M LARSON 
LAW OFFICES 
S T R O N G & H A N N I 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SIXTH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDING 
NINE EXCHANGE PLACE 
S A L T LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 5 3 2 - 7 0 8 0 
TELEFAX (SOI) 3 9 6 - 1 5 0 8 
ESTABLISHED 8 8 8 
GORDON R STRONG 
1909- I9€9J 
F LAVAR CHRISTENSEN' 
OF COUNSEL 
July 27, 1994 
Lynn P. Heward 
923 East 5350 South, #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
RE: Jennie Federico v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, Inc. 
Case No. 940197-CA 
Dear Lynn: 
I note that your brief shows the Industrial Commission of Utah as Respondent but 
does not show Sears, Roebuck & Company, Inc. as a Respondent. To avoid any confusion 
about the parties, please in the future list both the Industrial Commission and Sears as 
Respondents. 
Section 63-46b-2 defines "party" and "respondent" to include Sears. Section 63-
46b-14 provides that a petition for judicial review shall name the agency and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Yours very truly, 
STRONG-^ HANNI 
RHB:db 
cc: Sharon Eblen 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
7/109644 
1145 338 
